REGULATING INNOVATIVE MEDICINE:
FITTING SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES
MARK LAVENDER1

ABSTRACT
Increasingly, innovative medical products are creating a
quandary for the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) because
they often transcend the FDA’s traditional categorical approach to
regulating medical products. In a recent attempt to simplify this
process, the FDA has proposed a new rule for regulating
"combination products." This iBrief discusses the FDA’s current
approach and analyzes the possible affects of the proposed
regulation. Because of the many shortcomings of both systems, this
iBrief concludes that the FDA should instead stop assigning center
jurisdiction based on a product’s "primary mode of action," and
give the Office of Combination Products internal agency
jurisdiction over combination products. This alternative approach
would increase consistency and efficiency while maintaining the
FDA's high standards for medical product safety and efficacy.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Among other responsibilities, the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") is charged with ensuring that medical products
made or sold in the United States are safe and effective.2 In effectuating
this charge, the FDA assigns each product to one of three centers based on
whether the product is a drug, biologic, or device.3 However, medical
1
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2
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B)-(C)
(2000) (referring to human drugs and devices intended for human use). The
FDA is generally responsible for promoting "the public health by promptly and
efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the
marketing of regulated products in a timely manner." Id. § 393(b)(1).
3
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(a). Broadly, the definitions for the three
categories are as follows:
[A drug is an article] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man . . . [or] . . . [an article]
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
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products on the cutting edge of technology are increasingly crossing over at
least two of these categorical lines. Consequently, these "combination
products" face a hoard of regulatory snafus.
Within the FDA are three centers that oversee the pre-market
review and post-market regulation of human medical drugs, biologics, and
devices, namely, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"),
the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER"), and the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health ("CDRH").4 Although these centers
are under the umbrella of the FDA, they are autonomous organizations with
their own staffs, standards, and cultures.5 When a new, easily classifiable
medical product is researched and developed, it is submitted to the
appropriate center for review.6 Novel, innovative products that incorporate
aspects of two or three of the classifications, thus crossing traditional center
designations, are termed "combination products."7 In many situations, the
appropriate center for regulating a combination product is not certain.8
¶2

[A biologic is] a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine,
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous
product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease
or condition of human beings.
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2000).
[A device is] an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article,
including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or . . . intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body . . . and which does not
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within
or on the body . . . and which is not dependent upon being metabolized
for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
4
FDA Product Jurisdiction, 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(b) (2004).
5
See OCP Bridging Center Cultures at One-Year Mark, THE FOOD & DRUG
LETTER, Mar. 26, 2004, at 6. The differences are so great that the FDA is even
developing training programs for the different centers to better grasp each
other's varying procedures, standards, and organization. Id.
6
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-2(a).
7
21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e). The regulation states that a combination product includes
the following:
(1) A product comprised of two or more regulated components,
i.e., drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or
drug/device/biologic, that are physically, chemically, or otherwise
combined or mixed and produced as a single entity;
(2) Two or more separate products packaged together in a single
package or as a unit and comprised of drug and device products, device
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According to the FDA, “combination products have the potential to
make treatments safer, more effective, more convenient or more
comfortable for patients.”9 Recent examples of approved combination
products include: a fibrin sealant to assist sealing incisions received during
surgery; a spinal fusion putty to help grow new spinal bone; a fibroblastderived dermal substitute to cover, support, and grow new skin over a
wound; and new drug-eluting stents to open and prevent the re-narrowing of
arteries.10
¶3

and biological products, or biological and drug products;
(3) A drug, device, or biological product packaged separately that
according to its investigational plan or proposed labeling is intended for
use only with an approved individually specified drug, device, or
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended use,
indication, or effect and where upon approval of the proposed product
the labeling of the approved product would need to be changed, e.g., to
reflect a change in intended use, dosage form, strength, route of
administration, or significant change in dose; or
(4) Any investigational drug, device, or biological product
packaged separately that according to its proposed labeling is for use
only with another individually specified investigational drug, device, or
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended use,
indication, or effect.
Id. For the purposes of this paper, most of the discussion will focus on the first
definition, where "two or more regulated components [are] physically,
chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single entity."
Id.
8
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.4(a), 3.2(b).
9
See FDA Talk Paper, FDA Proposes Rule on "Combination" Products, U.S.
Food and Drug Admin., Pub. No. T04-13 (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01288.html.
10
Recent Examples of Combination Product Approvals, U.S. Food and Drug
Admin., at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/approvals.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2004). In more detail, the FDA noted that
innovative drug delivery devices have the potential to make treatments
safer or more effective, or more convenient or acceptable to patients.
Drug-eluting cardiovascular stents have the potential to reduce the need
for surgery by preventing the restenosis that sometimes occurs
following stent implantation. Drugs and biologics can be used in
combination to potentially enhance the safety and/or effectiveness of
either product used alone. Biologics are being incorporated into novel
orthopedic implants to help facilitate the regeneration of bone required
to permanently stabilize the implants.
Overview of the Office of Combination Products, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,
at http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/overview.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2004).
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In the future, combination products may well come to represent the
most innovative products, as "research is being driven by the very concept
of combinations."11 These products will likely continue to blur the
boundaries between drugs, biologics, and devices.12 Because of the rising
popularity and complexity of combination products, this iBrief reviews the
FDA’s current regulatory system surrounding these products. Further, it
analyzes a recently proposed FDA rule that would codify a definition for a
combination product's "primary mode of action." In conclusion, because of
the many shortcomings of both the current arrangement and the proposed
regulation, this iBrief suggests that the correct course of action is for the
FDA to stop assigning center jurisdiction based on a product’s "primary
mode of action," and to give the Office of Combination Products internal
agency jurisdiction over combination products.
¶4

I. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SITUATION
Currently, a combination product is routed to one of the FDA's
regulatory product centers by the two-year old Office of Combination
Products ("OCP").13 Its function is to "ensure the prompt assignment of
combination products to agency centers, the timely and effective pre-market
review of such products, and consistent and appropriate post-market
regulation of like products subject to the same statutory requirements to the
extent permitted by law."14 The OCP assigns a product to a center based on
its "primary mode of action" ("PMOA").15 If the product's PMOA is
determined to be that of a drug, biologic, or device, then the appropriate
center for primary jurisdiction is the CDER, CBER, or CDRH,
respectively.16 However, the term "primary mode of action"17 is not clearly
defined by either statute or the FDA, and its application has caused
¶5

11

Combination Product Applications Increasing, Crossing Traditional FDA
Medical Center Lines, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Mar. 26, 2004, at 1, 4
(quoting Janet Trunzo, senior vice president of global regulatory affairs at
AdvaMed, a medical device trade group).
12
See id.
13
The OCP was created by the Medical Device User Fee Modernization Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, § 204, 116 Stat. 1588, 1611 (to be codified at 21
U.S.C. § 353(g)).
14
21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g)(4)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
15
Id. § 353(g)(1). PMOA itself is fairly new terminology, being created by the
Safe Medical Device Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16(a), 104 Stat. 4511,
4526.
16
See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 353(g)(1)(A)-(C).
17
Id. § 353(g)(1).
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confusion.18 Adding to this uncertainty are the FDA's stipulation that the
center with primary jurisdiction may consult with other centers, and the
possibility that the FDA may require marketing applications to multiple
centers.19 In essence, the FDA has too many cooks in the regulatory
kitchen, which leads to inefficient, subjective, unpredictable, and costly
outcomes. These snags in the system also fail to result in improved public
safety.20
¶6
There is no codified definition or method for determining a
product's PMOA. Therefore, the FDA determines center jurisdiction for
many innovative products on a case-by-case basis;21 the relevant features
for determining PMOA may lie in the "eye of the beholder."22 Furthermore,
the determination may be influenced by what the sponsor does or does not
claim and how the product has been designed to achieve a certain
therapeutic benefit.23

A. Differences between product centers
¶7
There are substantial differences among the three FDA centers. For
example, in their requirements to demonstrate efficacy, the CDER and
CBER require at least one, randomized, placebo-controlled study, whereas
CDRH has usually been more flexible and typically accepts other study

18

Editor's Page: Unlocking the Future of Combination Products, MEDICAL
DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Dec. 2002, available at
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/12/001.html.
19
21 C.F.R. § 3.4(b).
20
Kshitij Mohan, Combination Products: Incrementalism Won't Work,
MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, May 2002, at 52, available at
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/05/017.html (conjecturing that the
new regulations "end up delaying or denying benefits to patients without
providing offsetting benefits of enhanced safety and effectiveness").
21
Barry S. Sall et. al, Getting Started with a Combination Product: Part I,
MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Mar. 2003, at 54, available at
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/03/03/018.html; see Sharon A. Segal,
Device and Biologic Combination Products: Understanding the Evolving
Regulation, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Jan. 1999, at 180
("Until [the FDA] establishes comprehensive and accurate processes for
designating jurisdiction and determining a product's primary mode of action, the
agency will continue to exercise its discretion on a flexible, case-by-case basis
regarding the more-complex or problematic products."), available at
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/99/01/016.html.
22
David Smith, A Primer on Engineered Tissues and FDA Classification of
Medical Products, PITTSBURGH TISSUE ENGINEERING INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.ptei.org/Industry/FDAPrimer.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
23
Id.
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designs. 24 Other differences between the centers include the following:
"statutory differences in approval times, . . . a greater likelihood of securing
approval for a product if it is designated as a device, . . . [and a]
manufacturer may be more familiar with a particular center or . . . want to
target a particular center for its tendency to evaluate certain types of
evidence . . . ."25
¶8
The classification of a medical product can have far-reaching
effects. A device classification may insulate a manufacturer from product
liability litigation, whereas a drug or biologic classification does not afford
such protection under the auspices of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.26 For the 2005 fiscal year, application fees will also vary significantly
among the different FDA combination product classifications; at their
highest levels, device user application fees cost about $240,000,27 whereas
user drug and biologic application fees cost over $670,000.28

Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala29 exemplifies the negative
effects of product classification. In this case, ultrasound contrast agents, a
device-drug combination product, were predominately assigned to the
CDER, but one manufacturer's product was assigned to the CDRH.30 The
pre-market review process differences were highlighted by one
manufacturer's comments: "The usual development of a device takes less
time than development as a drug. It requires fewer patients and less safety
and efficacy data. This results in development cost savings and increased
development speed."31 Additionally, in 1997, two of the manufacturers that
had their products reviewed by the CDER had already incurred $1.5 million
¶9

24

Alison Lawton, An Industry Perspective on Regulatory Oversight of Cell and
Tissue Based Products, 2000 PROC. WTEC WORKSHOP ON TISSUE ENGINEERING
RES. U.S. 240-41, available at http://wtec.org/loyola/te/usws/usws-07.pdf.
25
John Miller, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of Nanomedicine,
4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, at *23 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=4&article=5 (footnotes omitted).
26
David Smith, Legal and Regulatory Issues, 2002 WTEC PANEL REPORT ON
TISSUE ENGINEERING RES. 81, 83, available at
http://wtec.org/loyola/te/final/te_final.pdf.; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2000).
27
Establishment of Medical Device User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year
2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,153, 46,155 (Aug. 2, 2004).
28
Establishment of Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2005, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,165, 46,168 (Aug. 2, 2004).
29
963 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1997).
30
Id. at 24.
31
Id. at 29.
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and $3.7 million more in expenses than if their products had been assigned
to the CDRH.32
¶10
In addition to initial discrepancies between the regulatory pathways
and user fees at each of the centers, there are more subtle differences. For
instance, if a product is classified as a biologic or a drug, it can obtain
"orphan drug" status, which provides numerous benefits. 33 However, if the
product is considered a device, it can only obtain a "humanitarian device
exemption."34 The most significant difference between the two designations
is that a humanitarian device can only be intended to treat a disease that
affects fewer than 4,000 people in the United States while an orphan drug
can intend to treat a disease that affects up to 200,000 people.35 In addition,
an orphan drug can be granted market exclusivity for seven years from the
date of FDA approval, which is typically longer and less expensive than the
exclusivity obtainable by a patent.36 An orphan drug can also receive
"certain tax credits for clinical research expenses; cash grant support for
clinical trials; and waiver of the expensive prescription drug filing fee."37
¶11
After a medical product's approval, its classification has effects
outside the FDA's immediate sphere of influence. For instance, sales
representatives for drugs and devices are treated differently by hospitals and
clinics; while drug representatives are typically restricted, device
representatives have "almost unlimited access to their physician
customers."38

Stepping back inside the doors of the FDA, there can be problems
when a center obtains primary jurisdiction over a product with which it has
limited familiarity. The "designated center could very well lack necessary
information regarding components of the product that are outside its area of
¶12

32

See Id. at 29 n.9. Ultimately, the court held that when regulating and
reviewing a combination product, the FDA has discretion in how to treat the
product, but it is not allowed to treat two similar products dissimilarly on two
different regulatory tracks, without legitimate justification. Id. at 28.
33
Smith, supra note 26, at 84.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Fred Gebhart, Do Combination Products Spark Turf Wars? Hospital
Practice., DRUG TOPICS, Oct. 7, 2002, at 42. A manufacturer of a drug
orthopedic sleeve stated that "[a]pproval as a device is crucial to physician
access and to our sales effort." Id. (quoting Andrew Burns, spokesman for
Smith & Nephew, a medical device manufacturer).

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 1

expertise."39 However, the FDA has procedures and mechanisms in place
intended to help alleviate these concerns.

B. Inadequate agreements
¶13
Presently, the FDA attempts to bolster its assignment of
combination products through intercenter agreements, which are documents
the FDA has promulgated to clarify product jurisdiction questions between
two centers.40 Originally created in 1991, the agreements "describe the
allocation of responsibility, by center, for categories of products or specific
products which are a biologic, a device, or a drug."41 They also describe
methods for resolving disputes and conducting collaborative reviews.42
¶14
Unfortunately, the agreements are behind the times. In 2002, the
FDA realized this problem and called for a public hearing on the topic,43
stating, "[w]hile the Intercenter Agreements continue to provide useful
guidance, the evolution in technology and scientific knowledge about the
mode of action of medical products has in some cases pushed the usefulness
of the current Intercenter Agreements past their limits."44 Unfortunately,
the FDA will likely answer questions regarding combination products
slowly, as the Agency itself is uncertain about the "process and leadership
traceable to the inadequacy of the intercenter agreements" and because of
the recent creation of the OCP.45

39

Segal, supra note 21.
21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(1). The titles are as follows:
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health;’’
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research;’’
‘‘Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research.’’
Id. The agreements are available at the following internet address:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/intercenter.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2004).
41
Assignment of Agency Component for Review of Premarket Applications;
Guidance Documents Entitled Intercenter Agreements for Biologic, Device and
Drug Products; Availability, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,760, 58,760 (Nov. 21, 1991); see
21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(2).
42
Id.
43
See FDA Regulation of Combination Products; Public Hearing, 67 Fed. Reg.
65,801 (Oct. 28, 2002).
44
Id. at 65,802.
45
Ken Sumner, Attitude Adjustment, MX, May/June 2003, available at
http://www.devicelink.com/mx/archive/03/05/sumner.html.
40
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The intercenter agreements are only useful if a product's
characteristics are clear or specifically listed in the agreements; if not, the
agreements can be vague and difficult to understand.46 Contributing to this
quandary is the fact that the agreements are not binding,47 and do not cover
the increasingly common situation where a combination product
encompasses the characteristics of a drug, a biologic, and a device because
the agreements are only between two centers, not three—there is no
tripartite agreement for a medical product having characteristics of all three
categories. Therefore, while the agreements are a good attempt to solve
past jurisdictional questions, they are not equipped to handle new,
innovative products that encompass technologies not yet envisioned.
¶15

C. Time delays
¶16
If a product is not listed in the appropriate intercenter agreement or
if the proper center is uncertain, a sponsor can file a Request for
Designation ("RFD").48 The sponsor provides information in the RFD to
inform the FDA which center it believes would be the most appropriate.49
While an RFD may be useful to third parties who are similarly situated with
a similar product, the filings "are highly confidential, just [knowledge of]
the existence of a letter would give away a significant trade secret."50
Therefore, the general lack of guidance for innovative products can also be
attributable to confidentiality concerns.51 Also, the FDA's decision on an
RFD is not binding, and requests are determined on a case-by-case basis.52
For all of these reasons, the regulatory statuses for advanced medical
technologies can remain unknown for extended periods of time.53

46

Mary McNamara-Cullinane, Understanding the Request for Designation
(RFD) - A Critical Step in the FDA Regulatory Process for Combination
Products, REGULATORY, CLINICAL, & COMPLIANCE NEWSLETTER (Medical
Device Consultants, Inc., North Attleboro, Mass.), Mar. 2004, at
http://www.mdci.com/pages/nwsltr_0403.html.
47
21 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(2).
48
Id. §§ 3.5(b), 3.7.
49
Id. § 3.7(c)(2)(ix).
50
Flexible, Tailored Regulation Seen as Combo Product Key, THE FOOD &
DRUG LETTER, Aug. 15, 2003 (modification in original) (quoting Mark Kramer,
director of the FDA's Office of Combination Products) (available on Lexis).
51
Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54.
52
Id.
53
Id; see Miller, supra note 25, at *25 (stating that the process for determining
primary jurisdiction is "time-intensive").
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For most medical products, especially innovative combination
products, time is of the essence.54 Among other things, delays in the
regulatory process can delay or destroy projects, diminish investors’ returns,
and impact millions of people's lives by delaying or denying access to
innovative products.55 In fact, stakeholders have become frustrated because
innovation in this field is far outpacing regulatory approvals;56 the current
combination product regulatory approach has even been declared "woefully
inadequate" by one commentator.57 The PMOA process may be logical, but
it is not practical as it does not allow for effective assignment "based on
center resources and expertise."58
¶17

Further adding to the consternation of moving a combination
product through the FDA, a product sponsor can be certain that they will
encounter numerous entities within the Agency. Not only are there
potentially two product centers to interact with, but the Office of the
Ombudsman, which used to handle the OCP's functions, is still involved
even after the creation of the OCP;59 thus, a sponsor must interact with the
center having primary jurisdiction, potentially one or two consulting
centers, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the OCP.60 A non-combination
medical product, such as a straightforward drug, biologic, or device, would
not have to navigate the same maze, bypassing the combination product
regulations.
¶18

D. Taking care of business
¶19
The ambiguity created when attempting to classify cutting-edge
technology has led business considerations, rather than safety concerns, to
drive the decision of which center a sponsor will suggest for jurisdiction.61
One consultant advises companies to position their products to increase the

54

Gail Naughton, An Industry Imperiled by Regulatory Bottlenecks, 19 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 709, 709 (2001).
55
Id. at 709.
56
Id. at 710.
57
Editor's Page: Unlocking the Future of Combination Products, supra note 18
58
Id. (quoting Suzanne O'Shea, Product Jurisdiction Officer in the FDA's Office
of the Ombudsman).
59
Sumner, supra note 45. The Office of the Ombudsman now determines if a
product is a combination product, while the OCP assigns product jurisdiction
and sets appropriate policies. Id.
60
Id.
61
See Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54 (stating that "the developer must select
which center to propose for primary jurisdiction" and that "[b]usiness
considerations frequently drive this decision").
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chance of "obtaining a favorable jurisdictional decision."62 Such advice is
only a logical outcome from an amorphous regulatory situation because
investors and company management want to know what type of medical
product company they are dealing with—drug, biologic, or device—as this
determination will establish the timeline for their revenue stream.63 In
addition, because precedent is not binding, the company must be prepared
to justify product classification to all of the possible product centers.64

E. Looking forward
It is important to be aware of significant developing medical
technology fields where combination products will play a large role. Tissue
engineering is such a field worthy of attention, for not only the innovative
medical advancements it encompasses, but also for financial reasons. One
study forecasted that the tissue engineering market will develop into an
annual $196 billion industry by 2013.65
¶20

¶21
Tissue engineering is a broad field that is difficult to narrowly
define.66 One of the more straightforward definitions states that tissue
engineering is "the persuasion of the body to heal itself through the delivery
to the appropriate sites, of molecular signals, cells, and supporting
structures."67 These three areas correlate with the FDA's product centers;
therefore, tissue engineered products have the potential to cross all three
lines of the FDA's categorical approach. In fact, one commentator

62

McNamara-Cullinane, supra note 46. A favorable decision is often viewed as
occurring when the FDA assigns a combination product to the CDRH. FDA
Defines 'Primary Mode of Action’ for Combination Products, GUIDE TO
MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION (Thompson Publishing Group, Inc., Washington,
D.C.), June 2004, at
http://www.thompson.com/libraries/fooddrug/xray/samplenews/xray0406.html.
Prior to the Agency's rule proposal regarding a product's PMOA, an industry
group urged the FDA for "maximum use of device jurisdiction and authorities,"
noting that the CDRH had received "years of combination product assignments."
Id.
63
Sall et al., supra note 21, at 54.
64
Id.
65
Bio-Engineered Cardiovascular and Skin Repair and Replacement Products
to Lead Growth in the U.S. and Worldwide Tissue Engineering Markets,
According to Medtech Insight Analysis, BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 9, 2004 (available
on Lexis).
66
JACQUELINE SENKER, HUMAN TISSUE-ENGINEERED PRODUCTS: TODAY'S
MARKETS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: LEGAL SITUATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF TISSUE ENGINEERING 3 (April 2003), available at
http://lifesciences.jrc.es/docs/TE_WP4_FinalReport.pdf.
67
Id.
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suggested that a better designation for tissue engineered products might be
as "biodeviceuticals."68
¶22
Such a biodeviceutical was involved in a critical tissue engineering
patent that was recently listed as one of ten patents that "shook up
society."69 A product resulting from the patent would undoubtedly be a
combination product: the patent covered regeneration of spinal tissue using
"a sponge-like scaffolding filled with a special hydrogel containing adult
stem cells."70 The scaffolding and hydrogel would likely be considered
medical devices and the cellular component would likely be viewed as a
biologic.71
¶23
The FDA is actively engaged in developing rational product
development pathways, but these must fit into the existing well-established
statutory scheme for classifying medical products.72 Tissue engineered
products do not fit well into this regulatory arrangement.73
¶24
The Agency's classification has broader implications than just
indicating the center with jurisdictional and approval pathways for a
product.74 The classification of tissue engineered products may cause those
products' commercial development to be more dependent on the regulatory
approval process than on clinical outcomes.75 The inconsistencies in the
regulatory process "would increase the complexity of introducing new
medical technologies incorporating human tissues without materially
advancing public health or safety."76
¶25
Tissue engineering products are usually assigned to either the
CBER or the CDRH, which have different statutory standards for

68

Naughton, supra note 54, at 709. (adding that these are "products that replace
a tissue, tissue component, or a whole organ, which are bio-interactive and
respond to the physiological needs of their local environment").
69
Alan Cohen, 10 Patents That Changed the World, IP WORDWIDE, Aug. 8,
2002, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1028321279955.
70
Alan Cohen, Not Quite the Bionic Man, IP WORDWIDE, Aug. 8, 2002, at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1028321282569.
71
See Segal supra note 21 (noticing that a similar product, combining cells and
scaffolding to treat skin wounds, met the requirements for a biologic and a
device).
72
Smith, supra note 26, at 81.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 82.
75
Id. at 94.
76
David Smith, Introduction to Legal and Regulatory Issues, 2000 PROC.
WTEC WORKSHOP ON TISSUE ENGINEERING RES. U.S. 225, 227 available at
http://wtec.org/loyola/te/usws/usws-07.pdf.
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determining safety and efficacy.77 The CDRH looks at whether a product is
"safe and effective,"78 whereas the CBER looks at a product's "saf[ety],
pur[ity], and poten[cy]."79 One researcher cited this difference among
others in stating that the ability to take a tissue engineered product "from
'bench to bedside' is fraught with a litany of administrative guidelines."80
The scientist noted that these products must comply with the CBER's druglike requirements of demonstrating a product's "dose and potency."81 There
are difficulties in proving these conditions for tissue engineered products
which incorporate living cells.82 This problem does not exist under the
device standards of the CDRH.83
Tissue engineering exemplifies the trials and tribulations that must
be overcome to bring a modern medical combination product to market.
Unforeseen innovative technologies would likely encounter similar hurdles
if the regulatory situation remains static. In light of these growing concerns,
the FDA has not sat idle.
¶26

II. THE FDA’S SOLUTION
¶27
In May 2004, the FDA proposed a new rule to address many of the
matters discussed above.84 The proposed rule's purpose is two-fold: "(1) to
codify . . . the criterion the FDA has used for more than a decade when
assigning combination products to a particular Center within the agency for
review; and (2) to simplify the assignment process."85 In addition, the FDA
explained, the new rule should "promote the public health by codifying the
agency's criteria for the assignment of combination products in transparent,
consistent, and predictable terms."86 Unfortunately, the new rule does not

77

See Smith, supra note 22 (stating that "there may be some subtle variation in
the measurement of [safety and efficacy] among the FDA Centers").
78
Smith, supra note 26, at 87; see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1).
79
Smith, supra note 26, at 88; see 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I).
80
Kenji Izumi et al., Development of a Tissue-Engineered Human Oral Mucosa:
From the Bench to the Bed Side, 176 CELLS TISSUES ORGANS 134, 149 (2004).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 Fed.
Reg. 25,527 (proposed May 7, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3)
[hereinafter Rule Proposal].
85
FDA Talk Paper, supra note 9.
86
Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,527.
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generate the reform required for the regulation of combination products. As
of December 31, 2004, the rule had not been adopted.87

A. The proposal
¶28
The FDA's proposal would amend its current regulations in two
substantive parts. First, the proposed rule would codify a definition for a
product's PMOA.,88 the statutory standard that determines which product
center has jurisdiction for a combination product.89 Second, a two-tiered
algorithm would be implemented when a product's PMOA is not evident.90
¶29
The proposal explains that a product's PMOA is "the single mode of
action of a combination product that provides the most important
therapeutic action of the combination product."91 The most important
therapeutic action is defined as "the mode of action expected to make the
greatest contribution to the overall therapeutic effects of the combination
product."92 "Mode of action" is categorized as either that of a drug,
biological product, or device.93 In the process of formulating the proposal,
stakeholders informed the FDA that the PMOA should focus on the product
as a whole, and the Agency agreed,94 stating that the PMOA assignment
will be based on the most important therapeutic action of the product as a
whole.95
¶30
Novel products that combine aspects of a drug, biologic, or device
will not always have a single mode of action that provides the most
important therapeutic action.96 In these cases, the FDA's assignment
algorithm fills the gap. This two-tiered algorithm is spelled out in the
proposed rule as follows:

[T]he agency will assign the combination product to the agency
component that regulates other combination products that present
similar questions of safety and effectiveness with regard to the
87

For up-to-date information on the status of the new rule see
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination.
88
Id. at 25,528. The rule proposal also defines "mode of action," which would
only apply to a portion of a combination product, as combination products
typically will have more than one mode of action. Id.
89
21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g)(1).
90
Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,528.
91
Id. at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(m)).
92
Id.
93
Id. (proposed section 3.2(k)).
94
Id. at 25,528.
95
Id. However, the "as a whole" terminology was not included in the proposed
rule. See id. at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(k)).
96
Id. (proposed section 3.4(b)).

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 1

combination product as a whole. When there are no other combination
products that present similar questions of safety and effectiveness with
regard to the combination product as a whole, the agency will assign
the combination product to the agency component with the most
expertise related to the most significant safety and effectiveness
questions presented by the combination product.97
¶31
Practically speaking, the proposed assignment system would first
identify the combination product's modes of action and then ask a series of
threshold questions as follows:

1. "Which mode of action is the most important
therapeutic action of the combination product?";98
2. "Is there an agency component that regulates other
combination products that present similar questions of
safety and effectiveness with regard to the
combination product as a whole?";99 and
3. "Which agency component has the most expertise
related to the most significant safety and effectiveness
questions presented by the combination product?"100
¶32
The rule proposal also included three examples for assigning
products. These examples included analysis of a "conventional drug-eluting
stent", a "drug-eluting disc", and a "contact lens combined with a drug to
treat glaucoma."101 The examples designated jurisdiction to the CDRH,
CDER, and CDER, respectively.102 There was not an example of a product
being assigned to the CBER.

97

Id. "Agency component" refers to either the CDER, CBER, or CDRH. 21
C.F.R. § 3.2(b).
98
Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,533 (visually outlining the proposed
assignment system).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 25,529-30.
102
Id.
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B. The response
Two industry groups, AdvaMed103 and BIO,104 filed comments
regarding the proposed rule. First, the associations felt that it was important
that the new rule more directly address the role of FDA jurisdictional
precedents.105 Second, the groups advised the Agency to further clarify how
it would evaluate the PMOA by considering the combination product as a
whole.106 Third, AdvaMed desired that the last tier of the assignment
algorithm focus "on the [the center with the] most significant safety and
effectiveness questions presented by the combination product" instead of on
"the [center with the] most expertise related to the most significant safety
and effectiveness question presented by the combination product."107
Lastly, both associations expressed concerns with the simplicity of the
examples that the FDA had included in the rule proposal.108
¶33

C. The new rule does not substantially change the situation
¶34
Despite the best efforts of the FDA and the conscientious comments
of industry groups, the new rule will not eliminate the concerns arising out
of the current assignment system. In fact, the Agency and industry
stakeholders appear to be mostly concerned with maintaining the status quo.

The FDA stated that the rule's criteria are the same as the Agency
has used in the past; the rule will only formalize the process.109 In the rule
proposal itself, the FDA stated that the "[t]his proposal would merely clarify
and codify principles the agency has generally used since section 503(g) [21
U.S.C. § 353(g)] of the act was issued in 1990."110 Despite the proposed
¶35

103

AdvaMed is the Advanced Medical Technology Association and "represents
more than 1,200 innovators and manufacturers of medical devices, diagnostic
products, and medical information systems." Letter from Carolyn D. Jones,
Associate Vice President of Technology & Regulatory Affairs, AdvaMed, to
FDA, 1 (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter AdvaMed Letter], available at
http://www.advamed.org/publicdocs/cjones_ltr_8-20-04.pdf.
104
BIO is the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and "represents more than
1,000 biotechnology companies, academic institutions, state biotechnology
centers and related organizations." Letter from Sara Radcliffe, Managing
Director of Science and Regulatory Affairs, BIO, to FDA 1 (Aug. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter BIO Letter], at http://www.bio.org/reg/20040820.asp.
105
AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 3; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 2.
106
AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 7; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 2.
107
AdvaMed Letter, supra note 103, at 9.
108
Id. at 10; BIO Letter, supra note 104, at 3.
109
FDA Unveils Plans on Combo Products, THE BBI NEWSLETTER (American
Health Consultants, Inc., Monvale, N.J.), June 1, 2004, at 180.
110
Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,528 (emphasis added).
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rule's intent "to clarify and shed some transparency on the process, [it]
doesn't seem to change much."111 The FDA has been following the same
principles for almost 14 years; thus if it simply formalizes, clarifies, and
codifies those processes that have been regularly utilized, there will be little
substantive change to address the concerns raised above.
The vagueness of the statutory phrase "primary mode of action,"112
which is the source of the problems discussed above, would not change.
The concern with the current PMOA classification system is that "some
subjectivity is necessary . . . yielding a lack of consistency, predictability
and transparency."113 The ambiguity is intrinsic to the phrase itself. It
assumes that every combination product which exists has a primary mode
of action. Unfortunately, a combination product can have two or more
"therapeutic actions" equally contributing to a product’s "overall therapeutic
effects."114 This can result in similar products being assigned to different
centers, further decreasing the FDA's efficiency.115
¶36

¶37
The examples discussed in the rule proposal also confirm the
subjectivity of the algorithm. In the rule proposal, two similar products, a
drug-eluting stent and a drug-eluting disc were assigned to the CDRH and
CDER respectively.116 The differing centers were assigned despite the fact
that both products were implantable devices that used a drug to achieve a
therapeutic effect.117

111

Cindy Becker, Combo Devices Blur FDA Lines, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May
17, 2004, at 20.
112
21 U.S.C.A. 353(g)(1).
113
Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends,
DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER, Dec. 2, 2002 (quoting Mark Hamblin, a
researcher with Carnegie Mellon University) (available on Lexis).
114
See Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,532 (proposed section 3.2(m)). For
example, an "interactive wound-care product" (Apligraf, Organogenesis Inc.)
combined living cells with scaffolding, forming a cellular interactive biologicdevice product. Segal, supra note 21. The living cells comprise the biologic
and the mechanical scaffolding comprises the device. Id. Both modes of action
significantly contributed to the product's therapeutic function, as the cells
accelerated healing by providing a therapeutic effect via interactions with the
wound, and the scaffolding accelerated healing by providing a therapeutic effect
via enhancement of the wound's mechanical strength. See id.
115
One commentator discusses just such a situation arising with interactive
wound-care products where the acellular product (Regranex gel, OMJ
Pharmaceuticals Inc.) was assigned to the CDER while the cellular product
(Apligraf) was assigned to the CDRH. Segal, supra note 21.
116
Rule Proposal, supra note 84, at 25,529-30.
117
See id.
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The other issues would also remain because the difficulty in
determining a product's PMOA still exist. The proposed rule would still
require an inefficient case-by-case analysis by multiple FDA offices and
centers, maintain the questionable RFD process, and continue to result in
significant product review and approval delays. Business recommendations
rather than safety concerns would also still drive RFD letters for new
innovative products. Further, the intercenter agreements have not been
updated and, even if they were, would not likely help future, unforeseen
products. Lastly, significantly disparate treatment for similar products
regulated by different centers would persist. There would be differences in
product liability, cost, available special designations, and expertise between
the centers. Consequently, at best the assignment process would take
additional time; at worst "the process [would] kill a promising technology
because the time, expense, and uncertainty make development economically
unacceptable."118
¶38

III. SOLUTIONS: BIG AND SMALL
A. Alternatives to the new rule under the current statutory scheme
¶39
Alternative solutions that would not require major modifications to
the statutory scheme have been proposed. For example, industry
representatives agree that the FDA could propose a number of alternative
methods for determining jurisdiction by focusing on different categorical
schemes.119

118

Mohan, supra note 20, at 52. The author goes on to criticize the multi-center
approach because it involves the following: (1) "three mutually exclusive
organizations", (2) "three disparate sets of legal and regulatory requirements,"
(3) human beings, and (4) "the diversity of imaginative combinations that these
products entail." Id.
119
Biotech Combination Product Makers Facing New Designation Issues at
FDA, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Aug. 15, 2003 (available on Lexis). These
alternative methods to determine jurisdiction included the following focal
points:
Mode of use; Whether the product has a local, regional or systematic
effect; Which component of the product presents the greatest risk;
Primary mode of therapeutic action; Whether one component serves
only as a vehicle to deliver a therapeutic; How similar products are
regulated; What feature of the product predominates or represents the
innovations; and Which center has the best clinical skills and expertise
to assist the sponsor with clinical trial design.
Id.
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Another proposal suggested the adoption of a "risk-based
classification system."120 In this arrangement, product center jurisdiction
would be determined by evaluating "the element of the product that poses
the greatest risk to patient safety . . . and 'which center has the greatest
experience managing that risk.'"121
Alternatively, one researcher
recommended a lengthy "88-item weighted checklist that evaluates critical
characteristics of each product."122
¶40

¶41
The problem with these approaches is that they are variations of the
same theme: determining what is the most important aspect of a
combination product for classification purposes. Despite the combination
product program's objective to make certain that combination product
review is as efficient as possible, the process will never be as efficient as
with a non-combination product because the products are more complex and
more than one center is involved.123 The problems associated with using
multiple centers will likely persist; multiple center applications,
communications, and other extraneous transactions will continue to bog
down the regulatory system for combination products. A completely new
methodology and organizational arrangement is needed for products that
blur the boundaries between the traditional categorizations of drugs,
biologics, and devices.

B. New statute, new center, and a better approach
¶42
Initially, the source of the assignment problem must be addressed.
Currently, much of the consternation stems from the difficulty in classifying
a combination product. Whether PMOA or some other definition is
adopted, classification would still be an issue. Which center should be
assigned which combination products? In answering this question, it is
important to realize that there is nothing special about the current
categorizations between drugs, biologics, and devices. 124 One commentator

120

Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends, supra
note 113.
121
Id. (quoting Owen Fields, associate director of worldwide regulatory affairs
at Wyeth).
122
Risk Should Drive Combo Product Jurisdiction, Industry Recommends, supra
note 113.
123
Robert Drummond, Combination Product Reform to Speed Reviews, Increase
Accountability, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Apr. 2002, at 20,
available at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/04/013.html.
Determining the best way to make center designations has been analogized to
"measuring length to the fourth decimal place with a crooked ruler." Mohan,
supra note 20, at 52.
124
Mohan, supra note 20, at 52.
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noted that "[t]he future of medical technologies should not be held hostage
to history."125 Therefore, the statutory provision mandating the FDA to
assign jurisdiction based on a product's PMOA126 should be eliminated.
Doing so would remove the problem at its source.
¶43
Next, what is needed is not necessarily less regulation of
combination products, but a less complex system. Removing the statutory
authority and guidance for FDA regulation and review of combination
products will create a vacuum for those tasks. Filling this void, the OCP
should be more than just a gate-keeping service of the FDA. It should have
internal agency jurisdiction over the products and directly oversee their premarket review and regulation. In this sense, it would develop into another
product center.
¶44
This view is well expressed by another commentator, Kshitij
Mohan.127 Mohan believes that the best place to initially reorganize the
OCP is within the CDRH.128 This center has had the most exposure to
combination products over its history and is the most flexible of the three
medical product centers.129 The new OCP would draw a staff from an
interdisciplinary team of personnel currently in the other three centers and
utilize joint appointments for some scientists and reviewers. 130 Over time,
the new OCP would develop into its own center.131
¶45
Sowing the seeds for a new medical product center should increase
consistency in the regulation of novel combination products. This solution
would improve the current situation by improving "healthcare through a
more efficient partnership among FDA, academia, and industry to speed the
introduction of beneficial new technologies."132 It also "could become a
model for how all of FDA will evolve to meet the changing needs of the
21st century."133
¶46
In addition, a new OCP or center would follow the FDA's ongoing
efforts and the recently-announced 'Critical Path' initiative, which
emphasizes clarifying the complex therapeutic development process and

125

Id.
21 U.S.C.A. § 353(g).
127
Mohan, supra note 20, at 52.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
126
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helping to speed innovation.134 The new entity would not have to spend
much time analyzing where in the FDA a combination product should be
evaluated. The inefficiencies of requiring a sponsor to over-communicate
with the FDA's numerous combination product-specific entities would be
gone. The time lost from interacting with those entities and waiting for
RFDs to be fulfilled would also be eliminated. Intercenter agreements,
business driving jurisdictional decisions, and the major substantive product
differences resulting from center assignment would be removed.
¶47
As with most major changes, there will undoubtedly be some
resistance. A grandfather clause may be necessary to allay concerns
amongst current stakeholders who may feel that it would be unfair to
reassign their currently regulated or forthcoming products to the sole and
direct authority of the new OCP. However, Congress may have to directly
authorize this, as the court in Bracco held that the FDA is not free to place
similar products on separate regulatory tracks without legitimate reason.135
¶48
Also, many companies rely on classifications to determine their
sales strategies and they may negatively react to moving future products
into a new center or new OCP. For instance, device sales representatives
currently have better physician access than do drug sales representatives.136
Therefore, changing the regulatory scheme by doing away with a
combination product's primary association with the CDER, CBER, or
CDRH could be resisted by industry because of its current business model.

On the government's tab, creating a new OCP or center will not be
inexpensive. The staff, reorganization, and start-up costs may be high.
Currently the FDA lacks sufficient funds to move combination products
forward.137 Additionally, FDA regulatory staff size has decreased while the
number of pre-market approvals has increased.138 The director of the
CDRH estimates that half of the staff currently in the center will retire or
resign in between 2006 and 2011.139 The director's biggest challenge is to
obtain sufficient funding "to hire qualified reviewers."140 Consequently,
¶49

134

See FDA, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW
MEDICAL PRODUCTS iv (2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf.
135
Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C. 1997).
136
Gebhart, supra note 38, at 42.
137
Naughton, supra note 54, at 710.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. (quoting Advamed Urges FDA to Create New Combination Products
Office, DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER, June 22, 2001 (quoting David Feigal,
director of the CDRH)).
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manpower and funds will be lacking across the board at the FDA and
reorganizing a new regulatory body will be difficult.
¶50
However, these expenses can likely be absorbed in two ways. First,
if Mohan's advice is followed and the new regulatory body is created within
the CDRH, then much of the overhead for starting a new center should be
reduced. Second, if combination products reach their market potential, then
the increased user fees, combined with a more efficient combination
product regulatory scheme, should help fund additional costs.

CONCLUSION
¶51
For combination products, the current multi-center assignment
system, utilizing a product's "primary mode of action," should be eliminated
and the OCP should be more than just a gate-keeping service of the FDA.
Specifically, the OCP should have internal agency jurisdiction over
combination products and oversee their review and regulation by drawing
on the strengths of the other three centers. Keeping combination products
within the redesigned OCP should increase consistency in the regulation of
these novel products. This solution will improve the current situation and
follow the FDA's ongoing efforts and recently-announced 'Critical Path'
initiative, which emphasizes further clarifying the complex therapeutic
development process and helping to speed innovation.

